Agenda item

To receive an update on the progress to date in implementing Haringey’s Fire Safety action plan.

The Panel received a report which provided an update on the progress to date in implementing Haringey’s Fire Safety action plan. The report was introduced by Scott Kay, Head of Residential Building Services, as set out in the agenda pack at pages 39-48. Cllr Sarah Williams, Cabinet Member for Housing and Planning was also present for this agenda Item. The following arose during the discussion of this report:

a.    The Cabinet Member set out making sure residents were safe was of paramount importance to the administration. The Panel was advised that the Council had spent £11m on electrical surveys, £20m on fire door replacement, and £4m on smaller fire actions. The Cabinet Member also set out that the Council had completed a programme of high risk structural surveys and had begun undertaking other appraisals, such as in walls.

b.    The Chair sought assurances from officers about the deputation party’s assertion that nearly all of Haringey’s high rise blocks had combustible cladding and questioned why that information had not been presented to the panel in the report. In response, officers set out that the authority was required to provide all of the information on our buildings to Social Housing Regulator, particularly in regard to building safety. Assurances were given that the Council was developing a new asset management programme, one strand of which was around fire safety. Officers advised that information on the fire spandrel panels had been shared with the regulator and the fire brigade. Monthly meetings with the Borough Fire Commander also took place to review serious fire incidents and to look at emerging areas of risk.

c.    The Panel noted that Stellar House had an evacuation plan and questioned how it was determined that a building should have an evacuation plan versus and stay put plan. In response, officers advised that all high-rise blocks had a stay-put plan, unless there were specific circumstances that required an evacuation plan. The rational behind an evacuation versus and stay-put plan was determined by the building’s characteristics. In most cases a stay-put plan was considered more appropriate in order to allow the fire brigade to access the building, without having to deal with hundreds of people trying to evacuate the building via the staircase. Instead, each compartment of a high-rise building should be fire resistant for 30 minutes to allow the fire brigade time to attend and deal with the fire. Stellar House had been changed from a stay-put strategy to an evacuation policy, following a fire risk assessment due to the design of the building and the number of external panels.

d.    In relation to a follow-up question, officers advised that they were happy that a stay-put policy was appropriate, and that this was determined by the fire risk assessor and the risk identity was determined for each individual building at the time of the assessment. All high-rise buildings had been assessed and had a current up-to-date fire risk assessment.

e.    In response to a further follow-up question, officers advised that the Council had two internal risk assessors and also two vacant posts. Officers set out that it was difficult to hire qualified fire risk assessors, due to the fact they were in high demand and the market was very competitive. The Panel were given assurances that a very high level of assurance and certification was required as part of tender for a fire risk assessment company, including membership of the institute of fire engineers. The company that was employed by Haringey used additional resources, such as a sub-contractor. The sub-contractor had to meet the same characteristics as the main contractor. Officers advised that they had a high level of competency around fire risk assessments and also had experience of working with a number of other social housing providers.

f.     Officers advised that they were in the process of tendering for a major works contract, which included Stellar House. It was envisaged that works would begin next year.

g.    The Panel sought clarification about the number of overdue high risk actions set out at paragraph 6.9 of the report and the fact that there were around 1500 actions outstanding. In response, officers advised that part of the reason for self-referring to the regulator was an acceptance that this was not good enough and the Council had undertaken a voluntary commitment to rectify the situation. Officers advised that a number of programmes had been put in place to tackle the overdue actions. As part of the programmes, a number of contractors had been appointed and they had been asked to provide assurances about when these would be completed. Officers estimated that the overdue actions would complete by December. The Cabinet Member also set out that there were a number of mitigations put in place following the referral, such as alarm systems and building managers.

h.     The Panel sought assurances that the reduction of circa 2600 high level actions in the table was as a result of something having been done rather than just reclassifying the risk level. In response, officers advised that each action was the result of an observation by a fire risk assessor and could be that they were unable to access a particular fire risk assessment. As soon as that document was found, the action could be closed. Officers advised that a fire safety action would not be closed without the relevant evidence and that there was an audit trail for every action that was closed.

i.      In response to a question about the contractor, officers advised that the Council held a contract with a fire safety consultancy, called Faithorn, Farrell & Timms, who provide the management, administration and quality assurance for fire safety risk assessment. They then sub-contract out the assessments to a specialist asbestos contractor, who go out and carry out the fire risk assessments. The fire risk assessments are then quality assured by the main contractor and they are signed off by the Council. In response to a follow up question, officers advised that the contract was around £4m in value over five years and that around 1650 fire risk assessments were carried out each year.

j.      In response to a questions about in-house assessments, officers advised that there were two full-time fire risk assessors in house and two vacancies. The in-house assessors carried out some of the FRAs and other inspections such as quarterly inspections of communal doors.

k.    In response to a question, officers advised that there was a constant churn of fire safety actions, and that new actions were raised as a matter of course. However, the actions referred to in the report were specifically those that were reported to the regulator as part of the Council’s self-referral.

l.      In relation to a questions about how residents could report fire safety concerns, officers advised that there was information on the website and that there was a dedicated fire safety email address to report concerns to, and that people should also speak to the building safety managers (in high-rise blocks).  In addition, the Panel were advised that residents had been engaged with and asked to undertake fire safety training. There was also a building specific resident engagement strategy for each high rise block.

m.  In response to a question, officers advised that grills, gates and barriers to doors and windows were picked up by the assessors as an urgent fire action and passed to the tenancy management team to engage with the tenant to organise removal.

n.    The Panel was advised that each door was inspected during a fire safety risk assessment and that any non-compliance to the required standard would be picked up as part of the assessment, including for leaseholders. The Council has a policy that only wooden doors could be installed, rather than composite doors and that this was above the current regulatory standard.

o.    The Chair queried the extent to which progress was hampered by a lack of resources, particularly with regards to combustible cladding. In response, the Cabinet Member set out that fire safety would always be a priority. It was acknowledged that the political landscape for social housing had been increasingly difficult for a number of years, however, the Cabinet Member stated that within the context of affordability, it would be other programmes that would be rationalised. There was a fire safety programme in place, but that took time as it involved large scale procurement, there were mitigations in place to offset those delays.

p.    In response to a follow-up question, officers set out that there was only so much focus that could be dedicated to this area and that this focus inevitably came with an opportunity cost. However, that cost was to other areas such as planned works and retrofitting. It was reiterated that the Council would never under-invest in safety and that fire safety was an absolute priority.

q.    In response to a question, officers advised that they would like to see an increase in the amount of assessments and other related works carried out by in-house staff. However, this was difficult due to an extremely competitive marketplace.

r.     The Panel sought assurances about allocating those with mobility difficulties above the third floor and there being a stay put policy in place in that building. In response, officers agreed to get a written response about whether the allocations policy has specific stipulations about disabled residents to living above the third floor and whether we would seek to relocate them. (Action: Hannah Adler).

RESOLVED

That the report was noted.